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Related article: A Bank for the Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan	Berlin: Failure or Success? By Dr. Assem Akram 04-07-2004 On March 31 and April 1st, 2004, the international donors’ community gathered for a two-day conference in Berlin to boost and further fund the reconstruction/recovery of Afghanistan. This gathering followed that of Tokyo (Jan. 21-22, 2002), where some US $ 4.5 bn were pledged, with probably a rate of 60% of the pledges turned into real funding in the two years since Berlin. But the US-backed Karzai Government, and especially its influential Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, has revised the numbers. With the backing of Washington and the UN, Kabul pushed to reconvene with the donors to ask them to fund a $ 28 billion seven-year plan. Unfortunately, Kabul’s expectations were not met. Delegates gathered in Berlin pledged only to contribute a total of US $ 8.2 bn for the three years to come. This is less than a third of what was asked and one would still have to see how pledges will concretize. The truth is that these amounts may appear insignificant compared to what has been budgeted by the US alone for Iraq’s recovery, but at the Afghan scale, this is already serious money. It is noteworthy that most of it, US $ 4.4 bn, has been promised for the current Afghan FY 1383 (March 2004 – March 2005). The stress on the very short term probably comes from the fact that George W. Bush would like to be able to tell the American electorate how “successful” his Administration’s action in Afghanistan is and that, if they give him another mandate, he will be able to replicate the “Afghan Model” in Iraq. In the short while remaining until November, the pressure is on the US expeditionary troops in Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Hamed Karzai and the UN’s Jean Arnault to get visible, possibly spectacular, results that would help sell the White House’s foreign policy to the American voters. But the real question is will the agenda to hasten the Afghan reconstruction work as desired by the US Administration? The Berlin conference showed that not everyone was ready to commit beyond a certain limit. The non-amelioration and, in reality, the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan is certainly the key factor in the prudence manifested by donor countries. Other elements, such as a lack of qualified personnel and infrastructure capable to rapidly “absorb” the aid flow, or the frightening growth of bribery practices plaguing the administration, are certainly not helping either! The paradox here is that while everyone understands that restoring security is essential to any positive development in Afghanistan, nobody is ready to commit. NATO, which leads the ISAF, has tremendous difficulties to get men and equipment to fulfill its mission. While ISAF’s extension has been voted, it doesn’t have the means to noticeably expand its presence beyond Kabul; very unfortunately, the Berlin conference did not offer any hope in this regard.

News - Opinion - Analysis

A Bank for the Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan

Berlin: Failure or Success?

By Dr. Assem Akram

04-07-2004

On March 31 and April 1st, 2004, the international donors’ community gathered for a two-day conference in Berlin to boost and further fund the reconstruction/recovery of Afghanistan.

This gathering followed that of Tokyo (Jan. 21-22, 2002), where some US $ 4.5 bn were pledged, with probably a rate of 60% of the pledges turned into real funding in the two years since Berlin.

But the US-backed Karzai Government, and especially its influential Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, has revised the numbers. With the backing of Washington and the UN, Kabul pushed to reconvene with the donors to ask them to fund a $ 28 billion seven-year plan.

Unfortunately, Kabul’s expectations were not met. Delegates gathered in Berlin pledged only to contribute a total of US $ 8.2 bn for the three years to come. This is less than a third of what was asked and one would still have to see how pledges will concretize.

The truth is that these amounts may appear insignificant compared to what has been budgeted by the US alone for Iraq’s recovery, but at the Afghan scale, this is already serious money. It is noteworthy that most of it, US $ 4.4 bn, has been promised for the current Afghan FY 1383 (March 2004 – March 2005).

The stress on the very short term probably comes from the fact that George W. Bush would like to be able to tell the American electorate how “successful” his Administration’s action in Afghanistan is and that, if they give him another mandate, he will be able to replicate the “Afghan Model” in Iraq. In the short while remaining until November, the pressure is on the US expeditionary troops in Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Hamed Karzai and the UN’s Jean Arnault to get visible, possibly spectacular, results that would help sell the White House’s foreign policy to the American voters.

But the real question is will the agenda to hasten the Afghan reconstruction work as desired by the US Administration? The Berlin conference showed that not everyone was ready to commit beyond a certain limit. The non-amelioration and, in reality, the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan is certainly the key factor in the prudence manifested by donor countries. Other elements, such as a lack of qualified personnel and infrastructure capable to rapidly “absorb” the aid flow, or the frightening growth of bribery practices plaguing the administration, are certainly not helping either!

The paradox here is that while everyone understands that restoring security is essential to any positive development in Afghanistan, nobody is ready to commit. NATO, which leads the ISAF, has tremendous difficulties to get men and equipment to fulfill its mission. While ISAF’s extension has been voted, it doesn’t have the means to noticeably expand its presence beyond Kabul; very unfortunately, the Berlin conference did not offer any hope in this regard.