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News - Opinion - Analysis | ||
Other contributions by Jan Qarabaghi: Watch of the Battle of the Puppets Tale of Two Plans: the Marshall Plan and the 'Peanut' Plan Not In the Name of My God, Not in the Name of My Freedom G8 Summit: It Takes Two to Tango The Threat of B52 and the Palliative Effect of Kleptomania "Grand Assembly" or Grand Deceit? | The Afghan Presidential Election: ~ Jan Qarabaghi ~ After months of uncertainty, political wrangling, and procrastination, the political season for the election (hiring?) of a future president for Afghanistan began on July 27, 2004. On this particular date, The Joint Election Management Body (JEMB), a creation of UNAMA and its supporting foreign powers, published a list of 23 well-know, less-known, and not-known personalities who have announced their intention to compete for the job. The fact that the most demeaning, the most difficult, the most dangerous, and perhaps the most inconsequential job in the world could attract so many applicants is a huge anomaly in itself that raises legitimate questions about the political motives, and even the mental sanity, of at least some of the contenders: Do they really understand the conditions and the strings attached to being considered for the job, let alone receiving the job? Do they really understand the perils, limitations, and humiliations that are the integral parts of the job they are applying for? Do they really possess the background, honesty, qualifications, plans, and ideas that they must have if they truly wanted to perform efficiently and successfully in the job? How much formal training and civic experience (let alone credibility) do they have in running the affairs of a small simple village, not to speak of the affairs of an embattled, deeply injured, occupied, poverty-ridden, depredated, and divided nation? Have these contenders of the so-far unfortunate, ill-fated Afghan presidency heard anything about the recent loud thinking of the slickest among themselves, who could not resist playing with the idea of not going home back to his job in the hope of retiring in the Rose Garden of the White House? Have these claimants to the leadership (read blood-stained throne) of the devastated nation ever heard of or understood the meaning and wisdom of the famous Afghan saying "the sound of the drum is pleasant only from afar"? On the basis of the list published by the JEMB, very few, if any, of the 23 contenders in what one observer has called "the rat race," can produce a resume that could provide satisfactory answers to these and a litany of other important questions. (As a challenge to the political memory of the reader, the list of the 23 names is attached here. Try to find the names of those contenders that you recognize and, according to your honest judgment, could pass the litmus tests of political/moral uprightness, national recognition, and impartial leadership. If you are successful in finding such a name, or names, please send me an e-mail and I will apologize for the ignorance you might accuse me of!) Thus, the mother of all questions is this: Knowing that they do not have the chance, the ingredients, and the strengths needed to win in the presidential election at the national level, and more importantly, knowing that the outcome of the race is predetermined by Khalilzad, the American viceroy in Kabul, why then do these contenders, or more precisely pseudo-contenders, still bother to spend time, money, and energy to compete in a race that they know they will lose? In the murky and conspiratorial world of Afghan politics, where only a handful of actual players dare to unveil their faces, where proxy wars and deal-makings dominate the scene, and in which motivations and alliances are transitory, fluid, amorphous, and constantly changing, the flow of correct and consistent information is a highly scarce commodity, only available to those who can access the highest echelons of political power and the backrooms of political dealings. This is why initial analyses and predictions about Afghan political dealings and processes in general, and answers to questions such as the ones raised above in particular, tend to be less often correct and precise than analyses, predictions, and answers arrived at in the more open and transparent climate of a genuine, mature, law-based, and established political system. Nevertheless, with the above caveat in mind, I dare to say that participation in the motion of presidential election in Afghanistan by the 23 names is merely nominal, designed as a matter of formality, and for the purpose of maintaining the status quo. The end outcome, according to which Hamid Karzai, the American favorite and the British knight, is expected to misrule Afghanistan for another five years, has been already determined. The other 22 pseudo contenders are there to lend legitimacy to Karzai's pre-planned win. As compensation for his/her lamb-like participation, each participant will receive a reward in the form of money or official position that could generate a cash flow to amortize the costs incurred. Karzai gets elected and the rest of the 22 individuals get rich or richer. (It is noteworthy that, counting his participation and loss in the Bonn Conference in December 2001, at least one participant, i.e., Sattar Seerat, is taking part in this demeaning game of becoming a sacrificial lamb for a second time. Barring pressure from some unknown source, one wonders why Mr. Seerat, who has chosen the infamous Qazi Ameen Waqad, a former deputy of Gulbuddin Hakmatyar, as his running mate, is doing this to himself. Could it be the pitfalls of love in an old age?) It is noteworthy that those who have designed the election game in Afghanistan have reasons and motives that lie far beyond the long-term interests and well-being of the Afghan people. Among these reasons and motivations two are the most important ones: First, the designers of the game hope that on October 9 they will be able to convince the American electorate that the mission of nation building has been successfully accomplished in Afghanistan. This will deliver the success story that the Republicans will need badly when they face U.S. electorates in November. Second, the designers of the game also hope that with the Afghan spectacle of October 9 the world public and media will become convinced of the validity of their claim that democracy, in the hands of benevolent U.S. soldiers and skillful U.S. diplomats, is a potent technology capable of revolutionizing the politics of the Greater Middle East and Asia. Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc. wake up! The question that seems to remain unsettled though is whether Americans, Afghans and the world public are so naïve to believe what they hear from the designers of the plot. Are they so naïve to act as they are expected to act under the plotters' scenario? I, for one, believe they are not! List of the names of 23 presidential candidates published by JEMB: | |