Mistakes and the Mother of All Mistakes

Jan Qarabaghi

Five Years on and Some Troubling Questions

After five years of unfettered military campaign, and spending (some might say squandering) of over $70 billion on military, intelligence, propaganda, and reconstruction efforts, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan has apparently reached the expected crisis level, offering little cause for Afghans to celebrate. Instead of being thankful and appreciative of the U.S. and coalition efforts to “liberate” and “reconstruct” their country, Afghans seem to be dismayed and angry at the U.S. and coalition policies in their country. The scenes of recent mayhem in Kabul and the widespread, deadly clashes and bombings in the Pashtun-belt are shocking proofs that something has gone badly wrong with the U.S. and coalition policy in Afghanistan, a country which they have mindlessly reduced to the demeaning position of a cheap and marginal protectorate.

 

What did really go wrong with the U.S. and coalition policy in Afghanistan?

 

Why are Afghans resentful of, instead of thankful for, the aid they received in getting rid of the Taliban fanatics, whom they despised so deeply? Why the same Afghans who welcomed American and ISAF troops in December 2001 with great expectation and excitement are chanting “Death to America” and “Death to Karzai” now that America and Karzai have brought them “freedom,” “women’s rights,” and “democracy?”  Where are those truckloads of U.S.-invasion beneficiaries who chanted and danced on the top of lories while riding victoriously into the city they had once ruthlessly ruined, raped, and plundered? Why are the people of Kabul throwing dirt and refuse at the face of the man whom they not long ago supposedly elected as their president? Why the same forces that once happily opened the gates of Kabul to foreign troops are asking them to leave the city that they now own and occupy? Why has Afghanistan, under the nose of its foreign patrons, metamorphosed from a haven for terrorists into a haven for drug dealers and politico-business charlatans? Why are the ANA and ANP, after gobbling over $5.00 billion of international assistance, still unable to protect the lives and the property of Afghanistan’s citizens? These are only a few of the myriad of questions that remain unanswered by those who pride themselves for bringing democracy to a country where over 85 percent of its voters could not sign their own names or even read the names of those who stood for  election?

 

A Simple, Preliminary Answer

 

My answer to these questions (and a multitude of others not raised here) is disturbingly short but definitely in need of greater exploration: “A lot went wrong with the U.S. and coalition policies in Afghanistan, ranging from the rules of military engagement in the war against terror, to the creation of an ineffectual, corrupt administration to run the country, to the handing of politico/military power to the warlords and their cronies, to the disappearance and mishandling of billions of dollars of reconstruction funds in the hands of the U.N. and NGOs, and, last but not least, to the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots inside a society that has waited and craves for justice and fairness for the last twenty-eight years of bloodshed and strife.”

 

The Mother of All Mistakes

 

Without going into great detail, let me briefly remind the reader of the “mother of all mistakes” that gave birth to the mistakes that followed and led to the current stalemate.  

 

The story of this grand mistake begins with the infamous, narrow-based meeting of a dozen of Afghan warlords (with the marginal participation of the representatives of the former King) in the German city of Bonn in December 2001. This meeting, know as the Bonn Meeting, orchestrated by the U.S. under the auspices of the U.N., created a hastily written, ill-prepared document called the Bonn Agreement and laid the shaky foundation of a stillborn, protectorate administration filled with warlords and human-rights abusers of the last two decades who had no interest other than to usurp power, loot the public treasury, and escape the prospect of answering for their past criminal deeds, including being friends with and giving refuge to Osama bin Laden and his elk.

 

At the top of the oxymoronic administration created in Bonn was installed a weak, untested, un-experienced, low-ranking Jehadi functionary of a feudal decent, who was introduced to the general public as the “leader” of the majority Pahstuns. The combination of the Jehadi background and the Chimera of Pashtun leadership, along with the magic of tribal affiliation were thought to make up for the lack of public stature and national recognition under which the incompetent head of the oxymoronic administration suffered. Furthermore, direct intervention by the U.S. representative in the wheeling and dealing of the Bonn meeting lends credibility to the claim that the U.S., as the main initiator of the Bonn process, preferred to have a weak figure at the helm of the Bonn disposition to ensure unhindered access to the Afghan territory and politics for military and strategic reasons. Thus, the former King, as well as his representative Sattar Seerat at the Bonn meeting who seemed to enjoy the support of the majority of educated Afghans were pushed aside in favor of Karzai, who would perpetually remain dependent on foreign military presence and thus give the U.S. cart blanch access to the geo-strategic arteries of the Afghan soil.     

 

Those who were not familiar with the history and complexity of the Afghan society and politics, and wanted a quick and inexpensive solution for a deep-rooted, complex problem, welcomed and embraced this shaky arrangement. A few unwelcome voices who warned of the perils of oversimplifying the Afghan tragedy and compromising the high interests of the Afghan nation were either not heard or readily branded as pessimists or detractors, moved by envy and personal agendas.

 

Thy Harvest is the Fruit of what thy Sowed

 

The outcome of this catastrophic arrangement in Bonn was that those who had persecuted large segments of the Afghan population and ruined the country during the long years of the civil war became Afghanistan’s legitimate, internationally recognized rulers. The new rulers divided the booty of the Taliban collapse among themselves according to regional and ethnic divisions they had created and thrived on during the long years of Soviet occupation and civil war. Thus, the country was conveniently divided (and still remains divided) into personal fiefdoms of about 1800 so-called Jehadi commanders (1800 is the number cited by the U.N. sources).  The U.S. and the world community thought (of course falsely) that with bribe, appeasement, and occasional threat of force they will be able to reform the warlords into acquiescent politicians. It was hoped, particularly by the U.N. and its representatives at the Bonn meeting, that these warlords, turned into politicians, would come together and agree on a national agenda, thus, uniting the country and paving the way toward securing its people and borders.

 

Contrary to what was hoped by the U.S. and its allies, recognition by the international community did not (and will not) transform the warlords into wise politicians, rather it provided them with the legal foundation they needed to usurp and monopolize power in Kabul and the provinces. Thus, with the help of the U.S., its partners, and the U.N. warlords and hooligans of yester became political, judicial, military, police, business, and financial leaders of the new Afghanistan created in Bonn. Today, as a result of this grand miscalculation and false hope, we see ranks of the three branches of the government, military, police, business, and even civil society filled with ruthless warlords, long-time human rights abusers, well-known highway robbers, powerful drug dealers, political merchants, business charlatans, and entrenched smugglers. At least part of the bloodshed resulting from military clashes in the provinces, and most of the rage shown by the stone-throwing, unemployed youths on the streets of Kabul are clear signs of the anger and frustration people feel toward the unbearable conditions that the warlords’ rule has created in the country.

 

Unable and unwilling to tackle the warlords and their abusive power, the incompetent, putative leader of the beleaguered regime sticks his head into the sand of ignorance and proclaims: “These people [the demonstrators] are the enemies of Afghanistan. You [the people of Afghanistan] should stand up against these agitators and not let them destroy our country again."[1]

 

It is sad to see how debased and impotent politics and presidency in Afghanistan have become! If Karzai is certain that the demonstrators are enemies of Afghanistan, why doesn’t he order their arrest and punish them according to the law? Why does he jump to a false conclusion and calls every single participant of the demonstration “an enemy of Afghanistan?” Is it panic and fear that move him to make such an unsubstantiated claim? Or is it sheer stupidity? And why does he change his mind in a fortnight? Why is he inviting the populace to take the law in their own hand and deal with agitators and spoilers as they wish? By extending such an invitation to the populace, the president who is supposed to be the protector of law and order is inviting chaos and lawlessness. In today’s world, it is rare to find an elected head of the state inviting ordinary citizens to become the law and enforce the law. The president himself is the one who bears the responsibility for upholding the law and enforcing the law to protect the lives and the properties of the people. A president who is unable to do so, if he has an iota of decency and pride, would readily concede his incompetence and clear the way for someone else who may be able to uphold and enforce the law!

 

Moreover, an elected president must know that demonstrations are part of the democratic political process, and they are not always launched by the “enemies of the people.” How could a president who claims to believe in the democratic process be so arrogant to call someone “enemy of the people” because that someone dares to throw a stone at a solder of an occupying force who has just killed a dozen of his/her compatriots?

 

Well, to show some leniency to a satrap, perhaps we should excuse Karzai and his contradictory assertions in the context of the type of regime he leads and represents: It is obvious that lack of national sovereignty combined with rule of warlords is a business always fraught with contradictions. Anyone leading such a regime will constantly face the problem of having contradictory thoughts and thus making contradictory assertions.