By: Jan Qarabaghi

 

True democracy is a precious, alas a complex and expensive, public good, a public good that is under no circumstance tradable or duplicable: It cannot be easily exported or imported among nations, it cannot be purchased or sold in the marketplace, it cannot be imitated or implanted in unsuitable conditions; it has to rise and nourish from within the society, build on the fundamental beliefs and institutions of the citizenry, cope effectively with temptations of tyranny, and grow with the growth of the society, its members, its beliefs, and its institutions. Furthermore, the establishment and nurturing of a democratic system requires vast, long-term investments of money, time, effort, leadership, human ingenuity, political dexterity, socio-economic overhaul, and institutional buildup (the kind of serious investments one would expect to be part of a true “Marshall Plan”).

The creation and maintenance of a healthy democratic system that works, and responds to the needs and aspirations of the people, cannot be achieved unless the rulers and the ruled, the poor and the rich, the literate and the illiterate learn to show respect to the norms and outcomes of the democratic process. Democracy is a Great Social Game, a game that can be played successfully only within the boundaries of the rules of the game. These rules, commonly embodied in the constitution of the country, determine the parameters of action by the state and by the citizenry, by the civil society and by the military, by the judiciary and by the legislative, and provide guidelines for decisions of public and collective nature.

Furthermore, establishment and growth of genuine democracy in a post-conflict environment requires a drastic change of attitudes and habits, a new world outlook among leaders, and a new way of dealing with the critical issues of life among the citizens. It is obvious that attitudes and habits of leaders and citizens will not change unless the underlying matrix of incentives governing the socio-political order undergoes careful overhaul and is made conducive to the promotion of honesty, hard work, gainful enterprise, social cooperation, and respect for the law. In a nutshell, establishment and growth of democracy necessitates a new set of incentives and a new frame of mind.

Last but not least, it must be understood that a mere change of regime, while leaving deep-seated socio-economic ills of the society uncured, is an ineffective and wasteful way of helping democracy to grow and take root, particularly in a society afflicted by long years of conflict, individual irresponsibility, and state-sponsored violence and corruption. Among the uncured ills that might debilitate the democratic process at its infancy are lack of social justice and widening income gaps that inevitably accompany the initial stages of free enterprise.

 The complicated nature of the democratization process implies that the distance between the inception of a democratic system and the point of its maturity and perfection is not only long and tedious, but also fraught with hazard and uncertainty. No nation can travel this road alone without serious and sincere help from other nations who have traversed the difficult road before. Furthermore, success in reaching the finish line in the Great Game of democracy requires deep commitment to the cause of democracy itself, political courage, honesty, personal integrity, and individual sacrifice and selflessness on the part of those who are sitting at the top of the country’s socio-political and economic pyramid. It is through a strong and unquestionable showing of these traits that the torch bearers of democracy in a society might win the trust and confidence of the people, the kind of trust and confidence that is needed for the broadening and deepening of the democratic process and ideals.

Judged on the basis of this set of requirements, one can undoubtedly argue that so far, contrary to the barrage of propaganda at national and international levels, there is no trace of a genuine democracy, or even signs of its inception, in Afghanistan. What has been presented to the world as the beginning of a democratic process in Afghanistan has in truth been an orchestrated show of hired hands, hands that belong to a coterie of well-known warlords, hands that are bloodstained, hands that carry the stigma of atrocities committed during the last three decades of the Afghan history. These hired hands lack the intention, credibility, and skills to take Afghanistan on to the road to true democracy. The hired hands are well aware of the fact that a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” would be a government that would not stop at keeping the status quo, and, thus, would not keep them at the institutional and administrative helm of the state apparatus. Thus, the hired hands do whatever they can to impede the establishment of a truly functioning democracy in Afghanistan.

The strategy pursued by the hired hands and the warlords to prevent democracy from taking root in Afghanistan can be summarized in an old saying: If you can’t beat them, join them. To preserve their illegal power and privilege, the warlords of yesterday, with the help of highly-paid Western PR firms, have metamorphosed into democrats of today, simultaneously playing the double role of Pakhul-wearing warlords at the local level and that of tie-wearing politicians and democrats at the national level (i.e., within the capital city of Kabul). Ironically, as a consequence of political shortsightedness and military convenience, the duplicity of the warlords’ role is perceived to be good for the business of nation-building by powers who still willingly or unwillingly continue to invest a million or two in order to keep a lid on any real or imaginary danger that might once again threaten the post-9/11 world from Afghanistan.   

In such a an environment of duplicity, conspiracy, and contradiction, the killing of 17 to 20 demonstrators on the streets of Jalalabad and other Afghan cities in recent days should come as no surprise to anyone. In an environment where those running the state do not respond to the needs and deprivations of the populace, in an environment where the cause of democracy has been hijacked by warlords and drug dealers, in an environment where  no one seems to take responsibility for anything that goes wrong everyday in every corner of the country, in an environment where no one has been asked to pay a price for the atrocities committed during the past three decades, in an environment where embezzlement, corruption, nepotism, and theft of private and public wealth and property is the norm among government officials and hard-pressed private citizens, and finally, in an environment where warlords, drug dealers, state ministers, provincial governors, big wealth-holders, and garrison commanders are one and the same people, no one should be surprised that in such an unhealthy environment filled with vermin and serpents, and characterized with widespread kleptomania and violations of rights, a great number of ordinary people will be unhappy and upset, and thus sooner or later resort to violence and destruction to vent their frustration and anger. It is obvious that if civic and legal channels are closed for the hearing of public concerns, the alternative channel left open will be pure violence.

The events of the last few days in Afghanistan show not only the scope and intensity of frustration among the Afghan people, they also provide clear evidence of the inability of the Karzai administration and its supporters to fulfill the promises they lavishly showered over the Afghans in the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster: “Enduring Freedom,” democracy, massive reconstruction, and justice. The people of Afghanistan are not political idiots. Their country’s turbulent politics of the last three decades has taught them how to exactly draw a distinguishing line between genuine freedom and democracy and a shameful oligarchy run by warlords and a bunch of foreign, ill-informed PR firms. They know that if it quacks, it’s a duck not a chicken!

While certainly not political idiots, Afghans are, however, a polite, enduring, and patient people. They like, defend, and respect their guests; they are world-famous in their manners of hospitality and friendship, but are also susceptible to provocation. Once suspicious of the guest’s intentions, they act fiercely and violently; in such occasions, they do not pay attention to the severity of the harm they inflict upon themselves, but to the harm, even if little, inflicted upon the party they fight. Above all, Afghans live to be free and have a life of honor and pride. They take a real or perceived threat to their honor and freedom very seriously, and endure great sacrifices to repulse any power that threatens their honor and freedom. Afghans are divided on a lot of intra-Afghan issues; but when it comes to the defense of the honor and freedom of their land, they find it relatively easy to set aside their differences, to unite against the perceived common enemy. Having defeated the common enemy, they revert back to their old quarrels, until one day the appearance of another real or perceived common enemy brings them together.

In light of these human characteristics and historical teachings, it will be prudent on the part of the U.S. foreign policy makers to review and reevaluate the current state of their policy toward Afghanistan. America enjoys a tremendous amount of political goodwill among Afghans, thanks to the support she gave them in their war of liberation against the Soviet Union. This goodwill, however, like any other valuable asset, can be easily squandered and destroyed by the vagaries of political mistakes. One such mistake would be to ask Afghans for permanent American bases on their soil. The horrific memory of the Soviet occupation is still alive and fresh in the Afghan mind, and the present administration of Afghanistan is still too narrow-based, too untested, and too languid to make decisions of this proportion and significance.

Another fatal mistake in this connection would be to continue on the current path of using the warlords as bearers of the torch of democracy. Even if the U.S. succeeds in transforming the warlords into civilian tie-wearing, well-shaven politicians, because of the atrocities and abuses these people have committed in the past, they will not be able to win the trust and confidence of the Afghan public. The U.S. should treat the warlords as a spent force, as a set of assets (better as a group of liabilities) that have become obsolete and should be ditched. By associating with the warlords, the United States is running the immediate risk of squandering the Afghan goodwill and further discrediting itself in the eyes of the world public, including the Afghan public.

A third and perhaps a graver mistake on the part of the U.S. policy would be to keep propping up and pampering the Karzai moribund administration without any regard to the accompanying political fallouts and monetary costs to the United States. Karzai and his cabinet do not seem to have the political stamina, skills, ideas, charisma, and courage to deal effectively with the complications of the Afghan political and economic scene. Their goal is a mere daily survival with the constant American protection provided at the expense of the U.S. taxpayers. They do not possess the skills and the know-how to rebuild the country so that one day America can be relieved of the heavy burden of sustaining an unsustainable, unpopular ally.

The way Karzai and his administration have handled the issue of permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan has already inflicted a great deal of damage on the U.S. credibility in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is time for the U.S. to reassure Afghans and their neighbors. It is time for the U.S. to tell Afghans that U.S. forces are in Afghanistan only to fight terrorism and help Afghans rebuild their lives. The U.S. should state in unambiguous terms that its forces are not in Afghanistan for the purpose of gaining a permanent foothold in the heart of the Asian continent. Permanent bases are not needed to secure American security interests in Afghanistan. Modern technology allows the U.S. to effectively deal with any security threats that might emanate from Afghanistan even in the absence of permanent bases in that country.

And Last but not least, it is time for the U.S. to get serious about the important task of promoting freedom and democracy in Afghanistan, by opening the door for a more effective, more skill-based, more inclusive, and a more respectable administration. Another four, five or ten years of Karzai mismanagement will cost U.S. policy in Afghanistan dearly. Failing to make policy corrections at this important juncture will lead to further dismay and disappointment among Afghans about U.S. intentions, something that is (and will continue to be) used by warlords and other war-mongering groups to foment anger and animosity against the U.S. and its forces in Afghanistan.

© Qarabaghi 2005.