HOME
News - Opinion - Analysis
CONTACT


AssemAkramBlue.png


Previous Editorials & Articles:

نه کمونيست، نه اخوانی نه وهابی، نه طالبی، نه اجير، فقط ملی

داکتر عاصم اکرم

Regulating US Presence in Iraq and in Afghanistan

From Bonn to Baghdad

A New Political Lexicon For Afghanistan

April 15, 2004 Upcoming Elections: Security, Fairness and Commitment

Regalian Functions
April 7, 2004

Berlin: Success or Failure
April 07, 2004

نظری بر جریانات فعلی افغانستان و موضوع حاکمیت ملی -01.02.2002

11.26.2002
A Year Later, Anlysis and Perspective of US Engagement in Afghanistan : Time for a Change


Presidential Elections in Afghanistan:

The Rat Race

By Dr. Assem Akram – July 27, 2004

Monday, July 26, 2004 was set to be the deadline for candidates to register for the upcoming Afghan presidential elections scheduled for October 9th of this year. In a dramatic acceleration witnessed in the last few days, Afghans have learnt the proclamation of intent made by General Dostum, a militia commander and an adviser to Karzai on Thursday, July 22nd and, in the days following until the last minute before the deadline expires, the incumbent Hamed Karzai, Education Minister Yunos Qanuni, as well as Homayoun Assefi, Zaher Shah’s brother-in-law, and Professor Abdul Sattar Sirat, an adviser to the former monarch, have all registered to take part.

Why so much precipitation all of sudden at the last hour? I believe there are a couple of factors in play here: For one, Afghanistan’s political scene has seen rival factions brought together by the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 - as well as the ensuing “Pax Americana” - who otherwise do not really have empathy for one another. In the political game prevailing in Kabul, the purpose is to check the enemy without being checkmated. So, somehow, many are candidate also because their rivals or archenemies are candidate…

The second factor is the behind-the-scene game played by Mr. Zalmay Khalilzad and Washington. The US Ambassador in the Afghan capital, reminding us in many aspects of the Soviet Ambassador Puzanov’s ambivalent role in Kabul a couple of decades ago, implements a strategy by which he encourages as many candidates (at least 20) and political parties to be created as possible, with two objectives in mind:

  • To show the international community how the Bush Administration has been successful in bringing democracy to Afghanistan and Washington would be able to back up this assertion by boasting some impressive numbers: close to 20 candidates for the Presidential race, perhaps more than 50 or 60 political organizations potentially participating in the spring Parliamentary elections, and more than 80% of potential voters registered!

  • Mr. Khalilzad’s other objective, by pushing to the multiplication of candidates and parties, is to secure the chances of Hamid Karzai to reach, in a worst-case scenario, the pole position to enter the second phase of the race as a rallying figure. The strategy is exactly the same as far as the following scrutiny dedicated to electing a Parliamant is concerned. The objective is to provide Washington’s allies with a pivotal position that would allow them to build a parliamentary coalition in support of Mr. Karzai's action. We can be assured that Mr. Khalilzad would then, as he has done for the last three years (ref. Bonn, Loya Jerga 1 and Loya Jerga 2), know how to pull the right strings and use Washington’s “influence” to persuade everyone that Mr. Karzai is the “right choice” for the sake of Afghanistan…and Washington.

Whereas, in principle, it is difficult to blame the candidates for their enthusiasm to participate in an electoral process, one may nevertheless wonder if they all realize that they have entered a “rat race” as part of a larger scheme where they are being utilized to benefit Washington’s agenda and not so much their own… if they have any.

© Assem Akram / Afghan Observer 2004.